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•The Economic Significance of Federal
Lending and Loan Insurance
AT THE END of 1953 there was outstanding in the public's hands
nearly $43 billion of credit extended or underwritten by federal or
federally sponsored agencies (Table 13). About two-thirds of this
amount consisted of the insured or guaranteed portions of federally
protected private loans. About 69 percent of the $43 billion total
loaned or insured or guaranteed had been extended to homeowners,
percent to farmers and farm financing institutions, and 10 percent
to business enterprises. This vast pooi of obligations represented
the accumulated flow—net of debt retirements and repayments—of
over thirty-five years of federal credit activity. During most of this
period the trend of the annual volume of loans made or insured by
federal agencies has been strongly upward; federal credit activities
have grown faster than the value of gross national product or the
credit activities of private financial• institutions. The volume of
operations reached a new high during 1953, the last year under
study, when loans made, insured, or guaranteed by federal and
federally sponsored agencies totaled nearly $14 billion.
If one the amount of credit extended since 1917, with-
out deduction of repayments or retirements, itis found that the
gross volume of loans made, guaranteed, or insured, and stocks
and shares purchased by federal and federafly sponsored agencies
amounts to $138.7 billion. Of this sum, the share of federal agencies
consists of $37.5 billion of direct loans, $6Q.9 billion of loan insur-
ance or guarantee commitments, and $1.5 billion of stocks purchased;
$36.8 billion of direct loans and stock purchases were made by fed-
erally sponsored agencies.
What have been the effects upon the American economy of these
large federal lending and loan insurance and guaranty operations?
Their magnitude suggests that their influence has been profound,
though the analysis of these effects is complicated by the fact that
the programs have operated under widely varying economic con-
ditions and differed widelyto objectives and administration.1
1Federalcredit has not been the subject of extensive economic analysis. Apart










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Some programs have been designed to stimulate economic recovery
generally; others have been intended to divert resources to par-
ticular segments of the economy. Many have had unforeseen and
unintended economic consequences. in the wake of all øf them have
followed material changes in the credit practices of, and markets
served by, private financial institutions. The present chapter seeks
to analyze these relationships, grouping them into three broad cate-
gories :2
First,aggregative economic relationships, or the relations between
federal lending and loan insuring on the one hand and the general
level of prices and the over-all physical volume of production on the
other. In this analysis, the policies implied by federal lending and
loan insuring operations will be compared with federal policy in
expenditure and fiscal operations, with monetary policy, and with
private credit activities.
Second, resource-allocational effects, by which is meant changes
in the patterns of resource-use that have been induced by federal
credit activities, both as between and within major sectors of the
economy. For present purposes it is convenient to distinguish between
the agricultural, housing, and business sectors, which appear to have
been the segments most profoundly affected by federal lending and
loan insuring activities. An attempt has been made to appraise the
influence of the federal programs on the physical volume of produc-
tion, the level of costs and prices, and the debt-equity relationships
within each of these sectors.
Third, the institutional effects of federal credit programs on the
private fhiancial system, by which is meant the effects on the volume
of credit extended and methods of operation of private financial
institutions, their credit practices, and the economic functions that
they perform.
ing and loan insurance in treatments of monetary and fiscal policy, the articles
by Neil FL. Jacoby on "Government Loan Agencies and Commercial Banking,"
American Economic Review (Vol. XXXII, No. 1, March 1942, pp. 250-260), and
by Robert Friedman, Jr. on "Federal Credit Agencies and the Structure of Money
Markets, Interest Rates, and the Availability of Capital," Quarterly Journal of
Economics (Vol. LXIX, No. 3, August 1955, pp. 421-444), appear to be the only
efforts to assess its over-all economic effects, and they have focused attention
only upon the relation between federal lending and the banking system.
2Forbrevity, the phrase "loan insuring" will often be used to cover guarantees
as well as insurance; also for simplicity of presentation, stock and share pur-
chases are grouped with and treated as similar to long-term direct loans. For




The difilculty of determining the precise effect of federal loans
and loan insurance on gross national product is readily seen if one
poses the question: How much would GNP have been in recent years
if there had been no federal lending or loan insurance programs?
Clearly, the effect of a given volume of federal lending or loan in-
surance on GNP will depend upon where and how the funds involved
were obtained, and how they influenced the expenditures of the bor-
rowers. To simplify the analysis and the exposition, possible dif-
ferences in the effects of loan insurance and of direct lending will
for the moment be disregarded.
•The effect on GNP of a net increase of, say, $1 million in the
outstanding credit of federal agencies will depend principally on
the following: (1) the extent to which the net change in total public
and private credit outstanding is different than it would have been had
not an increase in public credit occurred; that is, the extent to which
the new public credit substituted for, augmented, or reduced private
credit ;8 the extent to which aggregate federal expenditures were
different than they would have been in the absence of an increase in
public credit; that is, the degree to which federal credit substituted
for federal grants, subsidies, or other expenditures (as when a guar-
anteed loan finances defense plant construction that would otherwise
have involved federal outlays); the extent to which the federal
credit was financed by taxes, by a reduction of federal deposit
balances, by the sale of securities to the banking system, or by sales
of securities to the public, and, if the latter, what the public would
have done with its funds if it had not utilized them to purchase fed-
eral securities; the degree to which borrowers from federal
agencies utilized the proceeds of loans to refund outstanding indebt-
edness or to increase their deposit balances, rather than to acquire
additional noncash assets; and (5) the degree to which borrowers
repaid loans by liquidating noncash assets, instead of drawing on
idle balances. -
Sinceitis not possible to obtain accurate and comprehensive
measures of these factors, any simple comparison of the magnitude
of federal credit operations with gross national product is subject
8Althoughfederal credit is at times extended to borrowers who would other-
wise obtain it from private sources, private agencies sometimes grant additional
credit on the basis of federal loans.
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to serious qualification if it be taken to measure directly the effect
of these operations on GNP. Yet certain inferences can reasonably
be drawn from such a comparison, and we shall proceed along that
line. First, however, it is necessary to consider (a) whether it is
essential in this connection to differentiate between direct federal
lending and loan insurance, and (b) whether the volume of credit
should be measured in terms of net or gross flow.
There are a number of reasons for believing that, in some cir-
cumstances, the expenditure-generating effects per dollar of federal
loan insurance have been at least equal to those of direct federal
lending. For example, if the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
stood ready to make a direct loan to a business enterprise, it would
also be willing to guarantee the major part of a similar or larger
loan made by a commercial bank. Loan guarantees were administered
by RFC strictly as alternatives to direct loans. Indeed, the expan-
sionary effects on expenditures per dollar of loan guaranty usually
exceeded those of direct lending by RFC, because the amount dis-
bursed by a private lender under RFC protection was often larger
than what would have been loaned directly by RFC without the
participation of a commercial bank.4
With respect to the federal guaranty under Regulation V of loans
to businesses engaged in war production, the similarity of the effects
of federal loan guarantees and direct federal loans is less clear.
There was no legal requirement in this case that the credit should
be unavailable to a business before the guaranty could be extended;
and there is evidence that a considerable fraction of V-loan credit
would have been extended by commercial banks in the absence of a
federal guaranty. -
Asimilar observation may be made with respect to the home mort-
gage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration and the
Veterans' Administration, which have composed the bulk of all fed-
eral loan insurance activities. Federal loan insurance has undoubtedly
increased the volume of home mortgage and its expansive
influence upon aggregate housing expenditures has been at least
as much as, and probably more than, it would have been if federal
4Inaddition, federal loan guaranty or insurance does not require the immediate
disbursement of federal funds and cannot, therefore, have a deflationary effect on
expenditures by impinging on tax funds.
5Ourdata show only the amount of the liability of each federal agency on an
insured loan, thus understating the economic impact of loan insurance by ignoring
the part of such credit carried at private risk.
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agencies had stood ready to make home mortgage loans directly.°
Yet the influence on housing expenditures per dollar of federal in-
surance has probably been.less than the impact on business and agri-
cultural spending per dollar of direct federal lending or of loan
insurance in those sectors of the economy, because a larger propor-
tion of home mortgage lending would have occurred in the absence
of any federal action. For this reason, it is probably incorrect to add
federal home loan insurance to direct federal loans, in attempting
to determine the impact of federal credit programs on GNP, unless
one reduces somehow the amount of home mortgage loan insurance
involved. Unfortunately, we have not been able to develop a satis-
factory method of determining how, or to what extent, the figures
should be deflated; our series will include the uncorrected amounts.
Regarding the relative merits of measures of the net or gross flow
of credit: there is strong support for the view that the net flow, or
change in the level of outstandings, provides the best gauge of the
impact of federal credit on the economy. The argument is that only
the net difference (positive or negative) between loan disbursements
and repayments exerts a thrust (expansive or contractive) upon
aggregate expenditures.7 On the other hand, it is sometimes argued
that the gross flow, i.e., the annual volume of loans made, and of loan
insurance granted, is a superior measure of economic impact, because
disbursements of loans may be expected to increase business and
consumer expenditures, whereas repayments of direct or insured
loans are unlikely to entail a proportionate reduction. in other
words, it is more likely that borrowers contracting new loans will
add to their expenditures than that those making repayments on
old loans will reduce them.8 There is the further consideration that
repayments are usually scheduled by existing contracts, and are not
susceptible to immediate alteration, so that public control of federal
6 Federal loan insurance probably resulted in larger expenditures on housing
than direct federal loans ofthe same type would have produced, in so far as
competition among private lenders resulted in greater promotional effort and in
expansion of the market.
7 See Gottfried Haberler's Con8umer Instalment C'redit and Economic Fhic-
tuations (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program,
1942), Chapter 8, p. 79, especially.
8 Repayments undoubtedly exert some contractive influence on the expenditure
rates of debtors, especially when loans are repaid in lump sums rather than
amortized over a period of years. Because the timing of the reductions in the
expenditures of borrowers will differ from the0 timing of their repayments, loan
disbursements in a given period cannot be compared with repayments in the same
period to determine the net effect of credit operations on aggregate expenditures
in that period.
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lending or loan insurance in the interest of economic stability must
rely mainly on adjustments in the volume of credits extended.
Each of the two measures—volume of credits extended and change
in outstandings—posses ses validity for particular purposes, with
the choice between them turning principally on what one believes to
be' the effects of repayments on the expenditures of borrowers. In
recent years repayments have grown so large (nearly $10 billion
in 1953) that it would be difficult to ignore them.9 We shall, there-
fore, utilize both measures in our analysis, and consider the relation-
ship of each to GNP. In addition we shall treat a rise in net lending,
in the same way as a rise in gross lending, without regard to whether
the net rises from a negative to a smaller negative figure, from a
negative to a positive figure, or from a positive to a larger positive
figure; likewise with declines.
RELATION OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
TO GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
The most generous measure of the importance of federal lending
and loan insurance programs in the national economy is the annual
ratio of the gross volume of these operations to GNP. By this meas-
ure, federal credit activities were less than 1 percent of GNP in
every year from 1919 through 1930, rose to 3.7 percent in
and continued (except in 1934, when they rose to nearly 9 percent
of GNP) to hold about that relative position through (Table
14). Although its high level in the early thirties was never subse-
quently regained, the ratio has shown no tendency to decline secularly
and may be said to have been a factor of considerable importance
relative to the aggregate expenditures of the economy for nearly
two decades.
The conclusions reached are not greatly different when one em-
ploys the more conservative measure of the importance of federal
credit activities in the economy, the ratio to GNP of the net change
in outstandings of federal loans and loan insurance. Through 1931,
9Overthe whole period 1917—1953, loan repayments and expirations of insurance
have amounted to 69 percent of the volume of credit extended: the ratio of repay-
ments and other reductions in outstandings to advances has been much lower
during years of rapid rise in credit operations (for example, 13 percent in 1920
and 27 percent in 1934) than in years of shrinking operations (for example, 114
percent in 1944 and 136 percent in 1945). For each dollar of net increase in out-
standings over a given period, federal agencies typically have extended about































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































annual net changes in outs tandings amounted to well under 1 percent
of GNP, but the percentage rose in 1932 to 2.2 and reached .a peak
of 6.6 percent in 1934. Thereafter the ratio fell, stood for a decade
at less than 1 percent, and then increased to between 1 and 2 percent
in the years 1947—1953. However, the increase during this last period
should be discounted at least in part, and the ratios for 1936—1943
and for 1946 regarded as rather lower than those given, since in
those. years the net increase in FHA (and VA) home mortgage loan
insurance was large in relation to the net increase in outstandings.
The figures on net flow bear out the previous observation that the
year 1934 probably witnessed the peak of the influence of federal
credit programs on the economy.
Have federal lending and loan insuring activities tended to amplify
or to dampen business fluctuations in the past twenty years? The
analysis may begin with the thirties, since federal credit programs
were too small in the twenties to have an appreciable weight in gen-.
eral economic conditions. The major economic decline of the early
thirties extended from a peak in June 1929 to a trough in March
1933, according to the National Bureau's business cycle chronology.
On a calendar-year basis, GNP fell sharply in each year of the period
1930—1932 (Chart 6). Although the gross and net annual volume
of federal loans'0 began to rise steeply in 1930, in absolute terms
the increase was not sharp until 1932. Between 1931 and 1932 GNP
declined $17.8 billion, while the gross flow of federal credit increased
$1.2 billion and the net $1.0 billion. The gross and net flow did not
change much between 1932 and 1933, while GNP declined only $2.5
billion. Between 1933 and 1934 an expansion in GNP of $9.0 billion
was realized. It is significant that the 1933—1934 increase in gross
volume of federal loans and loan insurance, $3.3 billion, was more
than a third as large as the increase in GNP, and the figure is not
much smaller when taken net of repayments. Federal credit programs
appear to have been an important instrument for the revival of
the -economy in these years, operating influentially as a counter-
cyclical measure.
The stimulating effect of federal credit programs diminished after
1934, as both the gross and net volume of loans and loan insurance
declined. In 1936 and 1937 repayments virtually equaled new loans
10Unfortunately,not enough quarterly data on federal loans and loan insurance
programs are available to make the more precise study of their cyclical influence
that such materials would permit.
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and. in 1937—1938 the increase in new loans barely exceeded the in-
crease in repayments. This withdrawal, on net balance, of federal
credit supports to spending may have contributed to, though it
could not have been a principal cause of, the short but severe down-
turn in general economic activity from mid-1937 to mid-1938. Fur-
thermore, although the revival in 1938 and the subsequent economic
upswing, which lasted through World War II, coincided with an
expansion of federal lending and loan insurance programs, neither
could have been much affected by it. The economy during these years
wasdominatedby the enormous rise in federal military expenditures.
The net flow of funds from the federal loan and loan insurance pro-
grams reached a peak in 19492, the gross flow in 1943. The decline to
1945 was due, in the main, to the tapering-off of federal guarantees
of war production loans under Regulation V.
By 1946, however, the postwar readjustment had been completed
and a construction boom was under way. In every year since 1946
the net flow of federal loans and loan insurance has been substantial,
and in 1950—1953, despite a rapidly rising volume of repayments,
the annual dollar volume approached or exceeded that of 1934, the
peak depression year. Coming as they did in a period of high-level
employment of economic resources due principally to other causes,
these increases in federal credit programs, while relatively small com-
pared with the increases in GNP, nevertheless must have contributed
appreciably to the price inflation of that period.
Additional light may be shed on the relation of federal credit
programs to general business conditions by considering the extent
to which the directions of change in GNP, on the one hand, and in
gross and net credit flow, on the other, have been concurrent or di-
vergent (Table 15). It appears that the gross volume of federal
credit has increased not only in every year that GNP declined, but
also in a substantial majority of the years when GNP increased.
On the average, the annual increase in• gross volume was about the
same when GNP rosewhen it fell, and in any case small relative
to the changes in GNP. However, the gross volume of credit has
frequently increased substantially during the initial year of revival
(i.e., 1933—1934, 1938—1939, 1946—1947, and 1949—1950) and it is
reasonable to call such increases counter-cyclical. On this basis the
gross volume moved in a counter-cyclical direction 15 years out of
924 since and the average annual increase during the 11 years
of contraction or initial revival in GNP was $1.12 billion, or ten
111ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
CHART6
Annual Volume and Year-End Outstandings of Federal Loans
and Loan Insurance, and National Product, 1917—1953
For data of lending and loon insuring by federal and federally sponsored agen-
cies, and of gross national product, see Table 14. Price index is from the sources
cited there for GNP, with the Kuznets series, 1919—1928, lowered by its 1929
ratio to the Commerce series (the latter, from 41 of the 1954 Supplement
referred to).
Shaded areas denote periods of contraction in business activity, as defined by
National Bureau of Economic Research reference
112
of dollars (1947 = 100)ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
CHART 6(concluded)
times the average annual increase during the remainingyears of
expansion in GNP billion).
In terms of the netvolumeof loans and loan insurance the counter-
cyclical record is somewhat better. Net volume rose more often than
not when GNP declined and fell more often than not when GNP rose.
Like gross volume, it rose during, each of the fouryears of initial
revival in GNP, and especially rapidly in three of them. On the
average the net volume increased one billion dollars per year during





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lars per year during years of expansion. It would seem therefore
that loan repayments, which constitute the difference between gross
and net, have imparted some degree of counter-cyclical behavior to
the lending programs—presumably by increasing more rapidly in
good times' than in bad." Consequently, it is difficult to credit more
than a part of this modest record to the conscious management of
the program. But this was hardly to be expected, in view of the fact
that unified management of the programs to promote economic stabi-
lization has not been a major objective.
To summarize: Before neither the annual volume, nor the
net change in outstandings, of federal loans, and loan insurance was
large enough, relative to GNP, to have exerted a significant influ-
ence on the general business situation; however, appear to have
imparted an upthrust to economic activity during the revival
the Great Depression. They were about neutral in their effects from
1936 to the end of World War II, but thereafter they contributed
appreciably to the postwar inflationary boom. In the aggregate,
federal programs of lending and loan insurance have a mixed record
in their influence on business cycles; they have operated at times in
a stabilizing, and at other times in a destabilizing, direction.12 On
balance, however, the programs have operated more often than not
to offset a contracting or depressed level of economic activity and
to give a stimulus to economic activity in the early stages of recovery
movement, especially when account is taken of the volume of loan
repayments as well as new loans made.
MOVEMENTS OF THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF
FEDERAL LOANS AND LOAN INSURANCE
It may be useful to inquire also whether broad components of fed-
credit services—for example, the activities of direct federal
11 The difference in the counter-cyclical record of the gross and net figures is due
primarily to the large volume of repayments during World War II (1940—1946)
and the Korean War (1950—1953). It is interesting, however, to note W. Braddock
Hickman's similar finding in his study of corporate bond financing. New money
offerings exhibit a moderately regular inverse conformity to business cycles, re-
payments a fairly regular positive conformity; as a result the difference, the
net change in outstandings, shows a markedly inverse association with business
cycles. See The Voinme of Corporate Bond Financing since .1900 (Princeton Uni-
versity Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953), pp. 116—
123, 152—154.
12 These conclusions regarding the cyclical effects of federal loans and loan
insurance correspond in most respects to those reached by Beryl W. Sprinkel
regarding the credit operations of the RFC. See his "Economic Consequences of
the FRC," .Iournal of Businesa, Vol. XXV, No. 4, October 1952, pp. 218f.
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agencies as distinct from those of federally sponsored agencies, or
direct lending regarded separately from loan insuring, or programs
directed to different major sectors of the economy—have been
mutually reinforcing or offsetting in their relationship to business
fluctuations.
Loans by direct federal agencies have passed through five rather
well-defined cycles. The first reached a peak at a volume of $666
million in 1920, in the post-World War I readjustment period; the
second reached a peak at $4.6 billion in 1934; the third peak occurred
at $1.4 billion in 1940, following the sharp recession of 1937—1938;
the fourth peak was $1.6 billion in 1947, the immediate post-World
War II readjustment period; after dropping in 1948, the volume
rose steadily and stood at $2.8 billion in 1953 (Chart 7).
Loan insurance activities of direct federal agencies date only from
1934, and reveal two major peaks in volume. The first occurred dur-
ing 1943 at a level of $5.1 billion, and reflected principally the V-loan
guarantees extended by federal military procurement agencies. The
second was reached during 1953, with a volume of $7.9 billion, largely
in consequence of FHA and VA insurance or guarantee of home
mortgage loans. Until 1949 the gross volume of the two types of
credit services of direct federal agencies moved oppositely as often
as concurrently; thereafter, they rose together. The net volumes have,
if anything, been less closely correlated than the gross.
Federally sponsored agencies have not offered loan insurance serv-
ices, and their annual volume of direct loans has fluctuated less
widely than that of federal agencies. For the federally sponsored
agencies, which have been managed more like private financing
institutions, there were two definite peaks in loan volume. The first
came during 1934, when $1.92 billion was loaned, mainly by federal
land banks; the second came in 1952, with a figure of $3.3 billion,
largely as a result of loans to farmers and farmer cooperatives.
Since 1930, the gross volume of credit services furnished by the
two types o.f agencies have moved concurrently in seven of every ten
years, but the net volumes moved in opposite directions in six out
of ten years. When loans and loan insurance are compared without
regard to type of agency, both their gross and net volumes show
movements of similar direction in about two years of every three
in the period after 1934 (when federal loan insurance began)'.
Thus in many years the activities of federal and federally spon-
sored agencies diverged, and there were frequent divergencies, too,
116ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
the movements of direct loans and loan insurance. In such in-
stances, of course, the programs tended to offset rather than to rein-
force one another's economic effects. Can we then discern any differ-
ences among them in the degree to which they may have promoted
economic stability? Tables 16 and 17 summarize the evidence. Of
the three major categories of activity, direct lending by direct
agenciesofthefederal government has shown thestrongest
tendency to rise during contractions and early expansions; indeed,
loans by federally sponsored agencies and loan insurance have
moved in a pro-cyclical direction more often than not. The net
volumes show a more consistent counter-cyclical behavior; loans, by
federal agencies, and even the loans of federally sponsored agencies
and loan insurance, taken on a net basis, show a preponderance of
movements.
Attention is now turned to the of the federal credit
services directed to different sectors of the economy—agriculture,
business, finance, and housing. Up to 1930, the preponderance of all
federal programs served agriculture; hence any intersector com-
parison can begin only with the thirties. During 1930—1934 the
annual volumes of federal credit to all sectors reached peak levels,
that for business coming in 1932, for other sectors in 1934 (Chart
8). After general declines through 1936, the patterns vary markedly:
in credit aid to agriculture, an almost uninterrupted growth; to
business, violent swings, with high peaks early in World War II and
in the Korean conflict; to housing, rises through 1941, declines dur-
ing the war, and then steep rises through 1950; to financial
tions, an irregular flow except for sustained rises from 1943 through
1948. After the counter-cyclical effort of the early thirties, the
relationship between business fluctuations and the course of federal
credit aids to'the several sectors is rather mixed. Most notable from
a counter-cyclical standpoint were the increases in the volume of
credit for housing during the recessions of 1931 and 1945—1946, an
increase in lending to business antedating and accompanying the
1937 recession, and an increase in lending to financial institutions
following the contraction in 1949. Taking the record as a whole,
it is the gross volume of credit aid to housing that has most often
moved counter-cyclically, while .aidto agriculture, business, and
financial institutions has moved in pro-cyclical fashion about as
often as not (Tables 17 and 18).
The net volume of credit extended to the several sectors shows
117ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
CHART7
Lending and Loan Insuring by Federal and by Federally Sponsored
Agencies: Annual Volume and Year-End Outstandings, 1917—1 953
118
'26 '29 '32 '35 '38 '41 '44 '47 '50 '53more consistent counter-cyclical performance than the gross volume.
Indeed, in the case of housing, when we allow increases in the first
year of a recovery to be reckoned as counter-cyclical, only three
instances of "pro-cyclical" movement appear in the twenty-year
record, the three being increases in 1939—1940, and
On this basis, too, counter-cyclical changes outnumber
pro-cyclical three to one in the agricultural sector, and nearly three
to two in the business sector. In the financial sector the pro- and
counter-cyclical changes are equally divided.
RELATION TO FEDERAL EXPENDITURES
Expenditures of the federal government, including grants, sub-





From Tables A-i and A-2. Stock purchases identifiable as primarily credit aid
are included; for other details, see Chapter 2, footnote 1.
Shaded areas denote periods of contraction in business activity, as defined by

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pro- and Counter-Cyclical Changes in Federal Lending and Loan Insurance,
Federal Expenditures and Deficit, and Federal Reserve Bank Credit,
1929—1953
.
OFYEAR-TO-YEAR CHANOES TIIA'!' ARE
Pro—
Pro- Cyclical Cyclical
Cy clicalaCyc licaibMo difiedc Mo di/iede TOTAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All loans and loan insurance
Gross volume 12 12 16 8 24
Net volume 14 10 18 6 24
Loans and loan insurance, by type
Gross volume
Loans, federally sponsored
agencies 7 17 11 13 24
Loans, federal agencies 14 10 18 6 24
Loan insurance, federal
agencies 5 14 8 11 19d
Net volume
Loans, federally sponsored
agencies 12 12 14 10 24
Loans, federal agencies 14 10 16 8 24
Loan insurance, federal
agencies 10 8 13 5 18e
Loans and loan insurance, by
economic sector
Gross volume
Housing. 12 8 16 4
Agriculture 10 14 14 10 24
Business 14 10 12 12 24
Financial institutions 8 13 10 11
Net volume
Housing 13 7 17 3
Agriculture 14 10 18 6 24
Business 14 10 14 10 24
Finaneial institutions 10 11 10. 11
Federal expenditures
Full period 11 13 11 13 24
Excluding war periodsh 10 7 10 7 17
Federal deficit
Full period 13 11 13 11 24
Excluding war periodsh 11 6 11 6 iT
Federal Reserve Bank credit
Full period 8 16 10 14 24
Excluding war periodsh 6 11 8 9 17
Tables 15, 16, 18, and 20.
aIncreasewhen GNP declined and decrease when GNP increased.
b Increase when GNP increased and decrease when GNP declined.
c Same as columns (1) and (2) except that during first year of expansion in GNP (1933—
1934, 1938—1939, 1946—1947, 1949—1950) increases are counter-cyclical and decreases are pro-
cyclical.
d 1933—1953 only. e 1934-1953 only. f 1933—1953 only.
g1932—1953only.
- hI.e. excluding 1940—1945, and 1950—1952.ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
the same results that may be brought about by loans or loan insur-
ance or guaranty. The Public Works Administration, for example,
employed loans and grants during the thirties to finance public works
in the interests of expanding employment. Both devices may stimulate
increased production and employment during periods of unemploy-,
ment; both may tend to inflate prices during periods of full em-
ployment. The effect on GNP of a dollar of federal loans or loan
insurance is probably greater in most instances than that of a dollar.
of outright federal expenditure, because the loan or loan insurance
is more likely to be accompanied by an equity investment by the
borrower. (However, federal grants to states or municipalities, if
conditioned upon matching expenditures by the grantee, also have
a multiplied effect upon aggregate GNP.) Hence, it is pertinent to
inquire into the importance of federal credit programs relative to
federal expenditures, and tp determine the extent to which the lend-
ing and loan insuring activities and the federal expenditure pro-
grams have reinforced or offset each other in their cyclical effects.
Two types of comparison may usefully be made; first, between the
gross flow of federal loans and loan insurance and the annual amount
of federal expenditures; second, between the net flow of federal loans
and loan insurance and the amount of surplus or deficit in the con-
ventional federal budget.13 The first is a comparison of gross amounts
of funds injected into the economy; the second, a comparison of their
net impact, when repayments of loans are assumed to have effects on
private expenditures analogous to payments of federal taxes.
A comparison of the annual volume of loans extended and loan
insurance commitments made with the annual volume of budget ex-
penditures indicates that credit programs have been a factor of
material importance in the financial activities of the national gov-
ernment since and that they were of vital importance during
the depression years 1933 and 1934 (Table 19). Credit volume,
amounted to 51 percent of federal budget expenditures during 1933
and 78 percent during 1934. During the remainder of the thirties,
annual extensions of loans and loan insurance were about one-fifth
to three-tenths the amount of federal expenditures, and they main-
13 Expenditures and surpluses or deficits in the conventional federal budget
are used, despite their many ambiguities, in preference to (1) the consolidated
cash budget, or (2) federal purchase of goods and services and surplus or deficit
on income and product transactions, because only the conventional budget pro-




Major Sectorsof the Economy: Annual Volume of Federal Loans
and Loan Insurance Utilized, and Year-End Outstandings,
1920—1953
Millionsof dollars
Covers lending and loan insuring by federal and federolly sponsored agencies,
from Tables A-i through A-8. Total includes loans to minor governmental units
ond loans for miscellaneous purposes, as well as the components shown. Stock
purchases identifiable as primarily credit aid are included; for other details, see
Chapter 2, footnote 1.
Shaded areas denote, periods of contraction in business activity, as defined by
National Bureau of Economic Research reference dotes.
(continued on next page)
tamedthis level of relative importance again during The postwar
years
If the annual changes in the amounts of federal loans and loan
insurance outstanding at year ends are compared with the annual
surpluses or deficits in the conventional federal budget, on the as-
sumption that the net deficit and the net flow of credit are more
meaningful measures of their relative importance to the economy,
federal credit programs assume an even greater significance. During
the 86-year period 1918—1953 there were six years during which the
net flows of credit were significantly greater than the amount of
surplus or deficit in the federal budget. Ignoring the years before
124ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
CHART8 (continued)
1930, in which both magnitudes were too small for meaningful com-
parison, it is found that during the depression years 19392—1935 the
net flow of credit equaled about half the amount of budget deficits
and in the single year 1934 the net flow exceeded the amount of the
budget deficit (Table 19). This suggests that during 1934 federal
credit programs may have made a greater contribution to economic
recovery than did federal fiscal operations. In the postwar years
1947—1951 outstanding federal loans and loan insurance (mainly
the latter) increased by amounts that were as large as, and some-
times larger than, the .budgetary surpluses or deficits, suggesting
that credit programs may have made a major contribution toward
the postwar inflationary boom; in and 1953 the increases in
125
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outstanding federal credit were smaller than, but nevertheless sub-
stantial relative to, the current. budgetary deficits.14
Have federal lending and loan insuring activities been harmonious
with federal fiscal policies in their cyclical impact upon the economy?
Although an over-all counter-cyclical policy was not deliberately
pursued before the Great Depression and since then has not always
been the major criterion in either the fiscal policy or the credit pro-
grams of the federal government, it is instructive to observe whether
federal activities have tended to help or hinder stability. A strategy
of general economic stabilization would call for concurrent reduc-
tions or concurrent increases, at appropriate times, in both federal
expenditures and the volume of loans loan insurance extended.
Thus one test of past experience is to determine the number of years
in which the directions of annual change in the gross flows of federal
credit aids and of federal expenditures matched or diverged. Over
the 36-year period 1918—1953 such changes were concurrent in 22
years and divergent in 14 years. Although concurrent movements
outnumbered divergent movements, the degree of concurrence is not
impressive. During the contraction of 1929—1932 and the beginning
of recovery afterward, federal credit volume and federal expenditures
rose together; but while expenditures rose irregularly from 1934
through 1937, credit programs contracted (Chart In the 1937—
1938 recession, federal credit and expenditures both rose, and by
roughly the same amoint. After the war, the gross volume of federal
credit rose not only in the brief contractions but through the entire
expansionary period, while expenditures contracted at first, then
rose, mainly under defense requirements.
An illuminating comparison may be made between net credit flow
and the size of the budgetary surplus or deficit. If federal credit
programs were to contribute to economic stability, reductions in the
net flow of loans and loan insurance simultaneous with reductions in
the budgetary deficit (or increases in the surplus) would occur at
appropriate times (e.g., when GNP was at a "high" level and rising),
and increases in the net credit flow would coincide with increases in
the deficit at other times (e.g., when GNP was falling or at a "low"
level). Tables 15 and 20 enable us to observe how frequently the
14 Use of the consolidated cash budget, instead of the conventional budget,
would not significantly alter the findings, The difference between the two was not
considerable until after when social security trust funds began to build up;
and federal deficits were sizable in most years thereafter, whether measured on a
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AnnualVolume of Federal Lending and Loan Insuring, Federal
Budget Expenditures, and National Product, 1920—1953
Series on gross and net volume of lending and loan insuring by federal and fed-
erally sponsored agencies, and gross national product, are from Table 14; on
federal expenditures and budgetary deficit or surplus, from Table 19.
Shaded areas denote periods of contraction in business activity, as defined by
National of Economic Research reference dotes.
changesin net loan volume and in the deficit have moved in like direc-
tion, and to judge at least roughly whether the movements were
favorable or unfavorable for economic stability. The results are
tallied in the following scheme, in which an increase in net lending
or in the deficit is termed counter-cyclical if it occurs when GNP
is falling or is in the initial year of recovery, while decreases are
counter-cyclical when GNP is rising (beyond the initial recovery
year). The two factors have moved together in a "counter-cyclical"
direction somewhat less than half the time, and on the occasions
.132
























• : I.— r')
•





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NET FEDERAL LENDING AND When GYP Increased Years When
LOAN INSURANCE AND IN GYP InitialOther GYP 1929-
FEDERAL DEFICIT DeclinedYearaYears TotalIncreased 1953
Lending rose, deficit rose 4 2 — 6 2 8
Lending fell, deficit fell 1 — 2 3 2 5
Lending fell, deficit rose I — 2 8 8 6
Lending rose, deficit fell 1 2 2 5 — S
Lending and deficit counter-
cyclical 4 2b 2 8 2 10
Lending and deficit pro-cyclical 1 — — 1 2 3
Lending counter-, deficit
pro-cyclical 1 2b 2 5 3 8
Lending pro-, deficit .
counter-cyclical 1 — 2 3 — 3
Total 7 4 6 17 7 24
a 1933—1934,1938—1939, 1946—1947, 194.9—1950.
b Rise in lending or in deficit is termed counter-cyclical.
when the two moved in opposite directions, net lending moved "coun-
ter-cyclically" more frequently than the deficit did.
RELATION TO FEDERAL RESERVE CREDIT
An inquiry into the economic repercussions of federal credit activ-
ities should examine the relationships between such programs and
monetary policies. Of special interest is the question whether move-
ments in federal credit-granting activities and movements in credit
made available by the central banking system have been reinforcing
or divergent. A pertinent comparison lies between the annual. net flow
of federal credit and the annual net change in Federal Reserve Bank
credit outstanding, because the latter provides the best objective
measure of central bank influences upon the availability of credit
from the commercial banking system. If economic stabilization were
a major objective, central banking policy would normally require
a progressive reduction in Federal Reserve Bank credit during ad—
vanced stages of economic upswings, and sharp increases in the net
volume of such credit during the early stages of downswings; and
federal credit policy would require concurrent changes in the net
volume of loans and loan insurance. Actually, the directions of
change in the two series were concurrent in only one-third of the 36
years embraced within the period 1918—1953 (Chart 10). Cyclical
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movements in the net volume of federal loans and loan insurance since
may be compared with movements in the net volume of Federal
Reserve Bank credit in Tables 15 and
The net volume of federal agency credit rose markedly during and
and after World War I but declined sharply in
(Chart 10). The net volume of central bank credit reached a peak
in 1918, and was cut back drastically during rising
sharply the following year. Thereafter, changes in both series were
comparatively minor until the onset of the Great Depression, when
both series rose. Beginning in 1934, central bank credit was reduced
and little change was experienced until the exigencies of financing
World War II brought a vast increase during the years
The net volume of agency credit diminished sharply in 1935, rose again
during 1938—1941. During the years 1943—1945 it declined, prin-
cipally in response to a reduction of guarantees of defense loans,
and by roughly the same amount that reserve bank credit increased.
There was a sharp contrast between the reduction in the net advances
of central banking credit in 1945—1946 and 1948—1949, in an effort
to curb price inflation, and the large annual increases in federal
agency credits outstanding. Since 1949 the two types of credit have
followed quite similar courses.







Years YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGE IN NET Years
Years When
GNP Increased
FEDERAL LENDINU AND LOAN




GNP 1929— Initial Other
RESERVE BANIC CREDIT DeclinedYeara YearsTotalIncreased1953
Lending rose, bank credit rose 1 3 1 5 2 7
Lending fell, bank credit fell — 1 1 2 3
Lending fell, bank credit rose 2 3 5 3 8
Lending rose, bank credit fell 4 1 1 6 — 6
Lending and bank credit counter-
cyclical 1 3b 1 5 2 7
Lending and bank credit pro-
cyclical — — 1 1 2 3
Lending counter-, bank credit .
3 pro-cyclical . 4 D 3 8 11
Lending pro-, bank credit
counter-cyclical 2 — 1 8 — 8
Total 7 4 6 17 7 24
a 1933—1934,1938—1939, 1946—1947, 1949—1950.
b Rise in lending or in bank credit is termed counter-cyclical.
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CHART10
Federal Loans and Loan Insurance, and Federal Reserve Bank
Credit: Outstandings at Year Ends, and Net Volume
during Year, 1917—1953
Millions of dollors
Series on loans and loon insurance by federal and federally sponsored agencies are
from Table 14; on Federal Reserve Bank credit, from Table 19.
Shaded areas denote periods of contraction in business activity, as defined by
National Bureau of Economic Research reference dotes.
loanand loan insurance policy shows less correlation with monetary
policy than with fiscal policy. Indeed, counter-cyclical movements
have been appreciably more frequent in the behavior of federal lend-
ing and loan insurance than of federal reserve bank credit, during
both expansions and contractions in Gross National Product. Di-
vergence between these policies under some circumstances may be
defended, of course, but the record reflects defects in federal mone-
tary policies as well as inadequacies in the management of the credit




A summary of the foregoing materials on the relations of federal
credit programs to aggregate economic activity may be convenient.
Gauged by its relation to gross national product, federal credit first
became a significant factor in the economy in 1932. In that year the
volume of federal credit extended rose from under 1 percent to 3.7
percent of GNP; in no subsequent year up to 1953 did it decline to
less than 2 percent. Federal loans emerged as a major economic
force, consciously and deliberately employed to affect the level
of economic activity, during the Great Depression. The combined
lending operations of public agencies during the early thirties appar-
ently made a positive contribution to reemployment which matched,
if it did not outweigh, the contributions of federal expenditures.
139ECON.OMIC SIGNIFICANCE
This. appears to have been the only period in American history in
which federal credit aids were consciously used as the instrumentality,
pre-eminent over both fiscal and monetary measures, to combat de-
pression.
The annual volume of federal loans and loan insurance ran between
one-fifth and three-tenths of the amount of federal expenditures
during most of the thirties and during the postwar years 1947—1953;
in 1933 and 1934, on the other hand, it reached 51 and 78 percent,,
respectively, indicating the vital role of credit in the New Deal
effort to restore prosperity. During the Great Depression and in
the postwar years 1947—1953, federal credit operations appear to
have been at least as influential as determinants of total demand as
were federal fiscal operations. However, the record does not reveal
effective counter-cyclical coordination between federal financial pol-
icy in the two spheres; reductions in the net flow of loans and loan
insurance have accompanied increases in budgetary deficits nearly
as often as not, and conversely." Similarly, federal credit programs
do not appear to have been effectively meshed with federal monetary
policies to assist economic stabilization, a result which of course may
be due to errors or to emphasis on aims other than stabilization in
the management of either program. Stabilization would appear to
require concurrent changes in both the net flow of Reserve Bank
credit and in the net flow of loans and loan insurance by federal
agencies; however, the record reveals more years of divergent than
of concurrent movement.
The relations of federal lending and loan insurance operations to
other federal financial activities—expenditures, 'budgetary surpluses
or deficits, and central bank credit—and the relations of all of these
magnitudes to general economic activity, represented by GNP and
by the business cycle chronology, have been considered. The salient
figures for such comparisons are summarized in Table which
presents net changes in the various series during the expansion or
contraction phases of business cycles over the period
They reveal vividly how checkered has been the record of consistency
between federal credit activities and fiscal and central banking
activities, on the one hand, and between all these operations and busi-
ness cycle behavior, on the other hand. The principal generalization
15Occasionally,of course, there may be good reasons for such inconsistency.
For example, at the end of World War II (1945—1946) a decline in the federal
deficit was almost inevitable, and the increase in lending that occurred then can
easily be reconciled with the requirements of economic stability.
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TABLE 21
Changes in Federal Lending and Related Series















1927—1929 —0.04 +0.10 —0.50
1932—1937 +32.31 —0.43 —1.29 _0.18 +2.55 —1.26
1938—1944 +126.17 +4.23 _0.99 +7.52 +88.68 +50.98
1946—1948 +48.08 +2.45 +2.76 +1.91 —5.46 —7,75
1949—1953 +107.56 +0.22 +31.89
CONTRACTIONS
1929—1932 —45.97 +1.93 ±1.24 +0.52
1937—1938 +0.50 +0.10 —0.12 +0.59 +0.78
1944—1946 —2.15 —0.82 +2.05 —8.50 —55.82 —51.14
1948—1949 —0.02 +0.49 +0.02 —5.51 +8.88
a Data for 1927—1929 represent change in GNP as estimated by Simon Kuznets in S'wpple-
ment to Summary Volume on Capital Formation and Financing (unpublished), Part A:
Annual Estimates, 1919—1953, Variant III; other data represent changes in Department of
Commerce estimates of GNP as given in National Income Supplement, 1954, Survey of Cur-
rent Business, Table 2, p. 162.
b Represents changes in volume of direct loans and of stock and share purchases made by
federal and federally sponsored agencies, and in amounts of loan insurance or guaranty ex-
tended annually by federal agencies; from Tables A-i and A-2.
o Represents changes in the net flow of direct loans and of stock and share purchases made
by federal and federally sponsored agencies and of loan insurance or guarantees extended by
federal agencies; from Tables A-i and A-2.
d Represents change in the net flow of Federal Reserve Bank credit. Basic figures for 1927—
1941 are from Banking and Monetary Statistics (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1943) Table 102, pp. 375ff., and for 1942—1953, from Federal Reserve Bulletins.
e Data for 1927—1932 represent changes in calendar-year expenditures for general, special,
and trust accounts (as compiled from unrevised monthly Daily Statement figures given in the
Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury) and are not strictly comparable with data
from 1933 forward, which represent changes in calendar-year expenditures for general and
special accounts (as given in Treasury Bulletin, February 1954, p. 5, and April 1954, p. 1).
f Positive quantities indicate a rise in the deficit or fall in surplus; negative quantities, a fall
in the deficit or rise in surplus. Figures were obtained from sources cited in nOte e above,
and therefore the data for 1927—1932 have somewhat broader coverage than those for subse-
quent periods.
gNotcomparable with data for other periods.
that appears to be warranted from this record is that diversity of
movement and a lack of counter-cyclical coordination has charac-
terized federal financial operations in the past.
One characteristic of federal credit programs has been that, once
set in motion, they have tended, in the aggregate, to expand irre-
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spective of general economic conditions. Consequently, aggregate
federal loans and loan insurance continued to rise through the late
thirties and early forties, through economic recession and expansion
alike. The most important unstabilizing effects were experienced dur-
ing the post-World War II boom, when, largely as a result of federal
insurance and guaranty of• home mortgage loans, federal credit
operations were working counter to federal fiscal and monetary
policies. The reason, perhaps, is that some programs have objectives
apart from stabilization and also that aggregate federal credit is a
mosaic of many pieces: each particular program has been designed
to accomplish some special purpose and has been managed with that
end in view, often without regard to its effects on over-all economic
stability. Yet in the aggregate the programs have at times exerted a
profound influence on prices and production.
Resource-Allocational Effects
Federal programs of lending, loan guaranty, and loan insurance
have undoubtedly influenced the pattern as well as the aggregate
amount of investment in the American economy. Yet the identifica-
tion and measurement of this influence is exceedingly difficult. The
availability of credit service is only one of many factors that de-
termine the structure of resource use; underlying conditions of de-
mand and supply, including technological changes, have had a far
greater weight. Equally important, federal credit aids have formed
oniy a minor fraction, of aggregate available financial services,
private financial enterprise having supplied the preponderance of
this service in all major sectors of the economy, especially in the
business sector. The influences of federal credit aids upon the struc-
ture of investment are therefore subtle and difficult to trace clearly.
Nevertheless, itis possible to point to certain changes in the
physical activities of the economy presumably due to the operation
of federal credit programs. These are now described briefly for the
agricultural, business, and housing sectors of the economy (fuller
treatments being reserved for Part II), with emphasis upon em-
ployment and physical output, the prices of products, the incomes
and financial position of producers, and regional shifts in economic
activity.
AGRICULTURE
Although the relationship cannot be rigorously demonstrated,
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federal agricultural credit programs appear to have lowered the.
cost and increased the supply of credit to agriculturists. Thus they
have tended to bring about a somewhat greater allocation of eco-
nomic resources to farming than would otherwise have occurred.
There is some reason for believing that the effects of the consequent
expansion in the supply of agricultural products were such, given
the relatively inelastic demand for farm products, as to reduce some-
what the percentage of the national income received by farmers,
especially during the thirties, when employment op-
portunities were relatively unfavorable.
Apart from their effects upon agriculture's relative position in
the economy as a whole, public farm credit aids have produced in-
ternal adjustments within this sector of the economy. Thus, the
policies of the federal agencies. worked toward greater uniformity
throughout the nation in the costs of both mortgage and production
credit. They reduced farm credit costs, especially in the South and
West where loan rates have traditionally been the highest. The fact
that the largest proportions of delinquencies and foreclosures on
farm loans took place in the Old South and the West (particularly,
the northern Great Plains) during the thirties suggests that federal
credit aids were particularly potent in promoting the shift of
economic resources into farming enterprises in these regions.
BUSINESS
Relative to the total amount of credit utilized by business enter-
prises, loans and loan insurance by public agencies directly serving
businesses have been of minor importance. It follows that federal
credit programs for business probably have not had important direct
effects upon the aggregate amount of business employment and pro-
duction.15 Yet federal agencies of business credit have had significant
selective effects in stimulating investment in business firms of par-
ticular types and industries, notably the following: ocean shipping,
railroad transport, and foreign trade enterprises; new enterprises,
firms in comparatively unfamiliar lines of trade, and concerns which
were "marginal" from a banking point of view. However, whether
these resource-allocational effects have been socially beneficial is an
issue beyond the scope of this study.
16 Federal credit aids to agriculture and housing have probably had more
•influence, indirectly, on business markets and employment than have the pro-
grams directly serving businesses.
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HOUSING
The principal objective of federal housing credit programs. since
1934 has been to increase the volume of construction activity. The
weight of evidence regarding Title I insurance of loans, for home
repair and modernization during the thirties is that the program had
little influence in initiating the recovery of such expenditures, al-
though it contributed in some degree to their increase once recovery
was under way. This conclusion also appears to stand in reference to
the federal home loan insurance program, which was launched in
earnest in 1935.
An analysis of the effects of the liberal credit terms made avail-
able to home buyers after World War II through FHA and VA
home mortgage insurance, and Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion purchases of home' mortgages from private lenders, is more
complex. A comparison of the physical dimensions of the home build-
ing booms that followed World Wars I and II, after allowance for
changes in population and rates of family formation, strongly sug-
gests that residential construction was actually less during the years
following World War II than would have been expected on the basis
of post-World War I experience. Moreover, comparisons of the
post-World War II movements, of indices of residential construction
costs with those of commercial and industrial construction and of
prices of semimanufactured goods generally leads to a conclusion
that a considerable part of the effect of federal credit aid programs
in this period was to raise the cost of home construction and the
prices, of existing homes above the levels that would otherwise have
prevailed. Thus, it would appear that a material part of the impact•
of federal credit aids on housing was dissipated after 1946 in price
inflation rather than being utilized in the generation of increased
physical activity.
Apart from their resource-allocational effects, federal
credit aids appear to have done the following: first, promoted a de-
crease in the average size of homes and in the number of rooms per
home, a trend in keeping with urbanization and the decline in average
family size up to World War II; second, stimulated multi-unit proj-
ects developed on a cooperative ownership basis; and third, increased
the scale of operations of home building enterprises, thus promoting
production efficiency.
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Effects on Credit Markets and Lending Practices
It appears probable that the institutional effects of federal credit
programs have exceeded in their importance either the aggregative
or resource-allocational effects of these programs upon the American
economy. Even at those times or in those sectors of the economy where
federal credit aids seem to have had but slight direct influence upon
the physical volume of activity, they often have modified the markets,
practices, and economic functions of the private financial system in
profound and enduring ways.
AGRICULTURE
Federal land banks have tended not only to lower the price of
mortgage credit to farmers but also to liberalize maturity provisions
and loan size. In many years they have functioned as leaders in farm
mortgage markets, setting terms and conditions which private lenders
were compelled to meet if they were to retain their relative market
positions. Also in farm production credit, though to a lesser degree,
the production credit associations have been market leaders, in a field
formerly served exclusively by commercial banks. The result has
been, in part, that commercial banks and life insurance companies
have yielded market position to the publicly sponsored agencies; in
part, that they have lowered the interest charges and lengthened the
maturities of their farm loans. These effects of federal agencies on
farm credit markets occurred mainly during a long period of decline
in the structure of interest rates. Events might, of course, have taken
a quite different direction if federal agencies had pursued the same
policies in an economic environment marked by a stable or rising
structure of investment returns.
BUSINESS
Federal credit and capital were used with dramatic effects during
the thirties to maintain the solvency and enhance the risk-taking
ability of private institutions financing business, notably through
the RFC bank loans and capital programs. Although federal credit
activities have undoubtedly exerted a net expansive influence upon
the loan markets of banks and insurance companies, they have also
operated in certain respects to compete with, and to restrict, the
markets of private credit institutions by making relatively high-risk
loans at rates less than those necessary to cover the full costs of such
operations. They have often set rates which private institutions were
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unable to meet, mainly because of the.tendency of public agencies to
standardize their charges, irrespective of the size, term to maturity,
risk, or administrative cost involved in a business loan. On the other
hand, federal business credit programs have involved mainly a use
of amortized, term loans, and they have promoted the use of this
kind of credit by commercial banks. Public lending agencies serving
business have thus tended to influence private business credit prac-
tices in the same way that federal programs for housing finance have
tended to lengthen maturities and to promote the use of amortized
loans in the home morEgage market.
HOUSING
Federal housing credit agencies have exerted a persistent down-
ward pressure on mortgage loan rates, one of their principal objects
having been to reduce the costs of home mortgage credit. Yet a
comparison of the trend of mortgage interest rates with the yields
of corporate bonds suggests that the influence of federal housing
credit programs has been minor in comparison with the long-term
decline in the whole interest rate structure. The facts also show
that regional differences in rates charged on home mortgage loans
have diminished markedly; since this does not appear to be true of
regional differences in the rates carried by bank loans to business,
the trend to greater regional uniformity may perhaps be attributed
to federal home loan insurance programs. It is much clearer that
federal credit programs in the housing field have lengthened the
terms to maturity of mortgage loans, have helped to increase their
loan-to-value ratios, and, as noted previously, have greatly en-
couraged the practice of periodic amortization, although they did
not originate that practice.
When the influence of federal guarantees and insurance on the
volume of nonfarm home mortgage debt is tested by comparing the
movement of such debt with the movement of consumer installment
sales credit, it is found that between and 1941 and again in
the postwar years, uninsured installment sales credit rose more
rapidly. The stimulative influence Of federal insurance on mortgage
loan volume was substantial; but it is easily exaggerated. Broadly
speaking, federal loan insurance has not much influenced the dis-
tribution of mortgage lending among types of institutions, as is
demonstrated by the minor shifts since 1935 in the relative positions
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of commercial mutual savings banks, life insurance companies,.
and savings and loan associations.
In conclusion, federal credit programs have displayed, during a
long period of falling interest rates, a pervasive tendency to reduce
the costs of credit to borrowers, to increase the ratio of debt to,
equity, to lengthen the final maturities of loans, and to promote the
principle of periodic amortization of loans. Thus, they have
on the whole to cause private lending agencies to liberalize their
credit terms and to readjust their credit practices.
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